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The Ethiopian Second Republic and the 
Fragile “Social Contract” 
Jon Abbink 
Abstract: Eighteen years after the change of power and the ushering in of 
the second Ethiopian republic in 1991, the political process in Ethiopia has, 
according to most observers, rigidified and largely closed the space for rep-
resentative democracy. This paper will look at the main organizing political 
ideas or ideology of the current Ethiopian republic and to the nature of its 
governance techniques in the face of domestic and international challenges 
with reference to the debate on “failing” or “fragile” states. The new “social 
contract” defined after 1991 and codified in the 1994 Constitution is pre-
carious. Dissent and ethno-regional resistance to federal policies are dealt 
with mainly by coercion and discursive isolation. Oppositional forces voice 
the need for a rethinking of the organizing ideas and institutions of the sec-
ond republic in order to enhance political consensus and a shared political 
arena, but get little response.  
The paper will sketch an interpretation of governance in Ethiopia, fo-
cusing on the dilemma of reconciling local and modernist political practices, 
and will discuss the status of “republican” ideas, in name important in 
Ethiopia but mostly absent in practice. Explicit debate of these ideas is usu-
ally sidelined – also in academic commentaries – in favour of a focus on the 
ethno-federal ideology of the Ethiopian state.  
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Introduction: An Exercise in “Political Culture” 1 
“While republicanism should be an ideology of governing African na-
tion states as republics with an emphasis on liberty and ruled by people, 
the experience in Africa suggests that the very people who found a 
colonial dispensation abhorrent to democratic and republican values 
have ended up becoming the custodians of oligarchic and dictatorial 
regimes” (Mutumwa Mawere, Africa: Republicanism or Dictatorship?).2 
Thus wrote Zimbabwean journalist Mawere recently in a rare and perceptive 
column on republicanism in Africa. Many African states are republics, but 
rarely is the meaning of the republican formula the issue of debate. In this 
paper I discuss Ethiopia, which is, however, not an ex-colonial state, but 
faces similar challenges to develop a sound republican tradition. 
Ethiopia, a country with about 77m inhabitants, situated in a vulnerable 
natural setting and a persistent conflict zone, is unique in Africa with its 
federalist political system that gives explicit recognition to ethno-linguistic 
identities, of which there are about 80. The latter form the basis for citizen-
ship and define regional and district borders, education policy, budget allo-
cation etc. In the current “Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia”, which 
was avowedly an “experiment” when first proclaimed in 1991 by the politi-
cal leaders of the former guerrilla movement taking over power (the Tigray 
People’s Liberation Front3), the relation between ethnicity and democracy 
has remained tense and problematic (cf. Aalen 2006, 2008). This has led 
many observers to say that the formula of multi-ethnic federalism does not 
work well and produces local and “ethnic”-based conflicts, for which the 
federal state authorities then “have” to act as neutral arbiters but appear not 
able to prevent. The differences between the various regional states in Ethio-
pia, ranging from the huge Oromiya region to the tiny city state of Harär, are 
also significant, and lead to imbalances in the federation.  
It can be noted that studies and academic and policy analyses of the 
political dynamics in Ethiopia have predominantly focused on the “ethno-
federal aspect”: the extent to which ethnicity in politics has worked out and 
                                                 
1  For critical comments on earlier drafts of this paper I am grateful to the anony-
mous referees of this journal, and to the participants of the session “L’État failli en 
Afrique” at the 50th Anniversary Conference of the Centre d’Étude d’Afrique Noire 
(CEAN), Université Montesquieu-Bordeaux IV, Bordeaux, on 4 September 2008. I 
also thank my respondents as well as various government officials in Addis Ababa 
and in countryside locations for their often thoughtful and sincere reflections. 
2  See: <http://www.newzimbabwe.com/pages/MAWERE53.15099.html> (of 24 April 
2008, accessed 20.09.2008). 
3  For a new history of the TPLF by a former insider, see Aregawi (2008). 
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has led to democratisation, equity, or socio-economic development.4 Much 
less attention has been paid to the other concept in the official name of 
Ethiopia: the (democratic-)republican aspect. Ethiopia is a republic and 
having declared itself to be such, it is worthwhile assessing how the republi-
can experiment in Ethiopia has fared. As the following exploratory analysis 
will indicate, the results are not so positive. The Ethiopian case is important, 
because despite the country’s low performance on social and political indi-
cators5 and its bad reputation among human rights organisations, it is a 
major recipient of western donor-country funds, is a major new bridgehead 
for Chinese investment in Africa, and has often received fairly complimen-
tary reports from the World Bank and the IMF on the purely economic 
indicators. It also has instituted a political model that is a (risky) novelty, and 
which has some theoretical significance (cf. Turton 2006). In view of its 
problems, Ethiopia is also a relevant case regarding the debates on fragile or 
failed states in Africa, for which there is also a list and on which Ethiopia 
was placed 16th from a total of 177 in 2008 (its neighbours Somalia and 
Sudan are no. 1 and no. 2).6 Worrying indications are: persistent armed con-
flict and insecurity, lack of basic services for all, grinding poverty, non-sus-
tainable population growth, communal tensions, growing corruption.7 
Moreover, Ethiopia does not succeed in providing food security for its own 
people. Every year millions are in need – in mid-2008 the avowed number 
of malnourished or famished people was at least 4m.8 For the purpose of 
this paper it is important to note that indicators of democracy in Ethiopia – 
in the sense of representative, electable government and a competitive party 
system as well as an independent judiciary, a free press, the respect for hu-
man rights and habeas corpus, and a rule-of-law regime – are quite critical, at 
                                                 
4  There is now a voluminous amount of literature on “ethnic federalism” in Ethiopia, 
with hundreds of titles, many of them MA theses and PhD dissertations, and in-
creasingly critical in tone. For some studies: Aalen (2006), Asnake (2006, 2009), Kidane 
(2002, 2007), Paulos (2007), Solomon (2006), Tronvoll (2008) and Turton (2006). 
5  As evident from its low position on the UNDP Human Development Index: in 
2007 it was in 169th place (overall HDI value) out of a total of 177, showing no 
noticeable climb despite 16 years of “development” under the new regime. 
6 According to the journal Foreign Policy, see: <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/ 
cms.php?story_id=4350&page=1>, accessed 3 August 2008. 
7  In 2007 Ethiopia was ranked 138th on the 179-country Corruption Perception 
Index, and it is moving down. 
8  See R. Righter, Ethiopia: another famine, another avoidable disaster, The Times, 20 August 
2008; R. Hampson, Ethiopia’s new famine: a ticking time bomb, USA Today, 17 August 
2008. Also: Revised Humanitarian Requirements for 2008, Government-Partners Joint 
Document (12 June 2008, Addis Ababa), and Ethiopia – Emergency beneficiaries increase to 6.4 
million, IRIN news message, 14 October 2008. 
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least in the view of most independent observers (Smith 2007; EHRCO 2008). 
African and Ethiopian aspirations on democracy are not fundamentally 
different from people elsewhere (see Afrobarometer 2002) and have roots in 
local societies, but are usually not met by state elites. There is a nicely 
worded Federal Constitution in Ethiopia, but the government has difficulty 
in adhering to it. Moreover, the specific model of “revolutionary democ-
racy” officially espoused by the ruling EPRDF, the party built around the 
TPLF (see below), represents in many ways a contradiction to the pro-
claimed constitutional principles. 
This paper is an attempt to discuss the problems of Ethiopia’s political 
system against the background of historical and societal factors that have 
shaped political tradition and political attitudes in the country. In other 
words, to analyse “political culture” in the country,9 both on the level of 
elite functioning and evolving governance techniques as well as looking at 
the (often implicit) political attitudes, norms and expectations that the 
populace has of the political process (cf. Formisano 2001).10 Specifically, I 
intend to bring in the issue of republicanism into debates on the Ethiopian 
political system. The underlying thesis is that Ethiopia, while formally and 
constitutionally a republic, suffers from having no tradition of (civic) repub-
licanism (nor of democracy, except on the local level) and has not realised or 
even addressed the democratic potential of this political tradition.  
In order for the country to make progress towards a more deliberative 
and legitimate political system, this potential has to be developed. This 
would also make the Ethiopian experiment even more important in a com-
parative study of political reform in Africa and beyond. But whether this 
progress is likely to happen is a moot point, as engrained tendencies of top-
down elite rule and clientelism in neo-patrimonialist fashion (see Paulos 
2007; Hagmann 2005 for a study of one region) have reshaped the political 
                                                 
9  Interesting remarks on political culture in Ethiopia have also been made by Tron-
voll & Vaughan (2003: 32f.), although it is erroneous to identify the authoritarian 
“political culture” only with the Amhara and the Tigray (“Abyssinians”). Ethiopian 
history shows, on the contrary, that any state formation (be it the Oromo Ghibe 
states, the Käfa and Wälaitta kingdoms, etc.) developed an oppressive and authori-
tarian system of rule. Notably, on the local level most societies across the ethnic 
groups are in a sense democratic-republican, excepting the lesser role accorded to 
women and the young generations. 
10  The empirical component of the data used for this paper is based on observations 
and interviews over the past 10 years in a variety of locations in Ethiopia, both Ad-
dis Ababa, the Southern Regional State and the Wällo region, with the most recent 
interviews held in November-December 2008 (Addis Ababa and Western Oromia 
region). 
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arena in a structural manner, inhibiting political equity, governance reform 
and the recovery of a civic-republican programme. 
The lack of development of a democratic-republican system must ini-
tially be explained historically by analyzing the accumulated political atti-
tudes, values and processes as evident in a country’s “political culture”, here 
defined loosely as a particular pattern of (value) orientations, ideas and cus-
tomary practices relating to the political action of the leaders and the people, 
and that embeds the political system.11 It is important to note that political 
culture is not a static pattern of behavioural values but adaptable and re-
sponsive to circumstances and to elite action. 
Based on literature on the subject going back to the Discorsi sopra la Prima 
Deca di Tito Livio (1531), the pioneering work by political philosopher N. Ma-
chiavelli, I define republican core ideas as follows: liberty or sovereignty of 
the people/the citizens in a polity; non-domination and rejection of the 
claim of leaders to a “natural right” to rule (because of divine election or 
will, class position, or superior insight); no use of state power for personal 
gain or profit; and a recognition of the pluralism of the public cause, the 
discussion of which is to be open to the people, because from them ulti-
mately power is derived (cf. Maynor 2003: 27, 56-57; Pettit 1997: 274, 276, 
280).12 In political science discussions, e.g. about the failed state, one often 
meets the Rousseauean republican concept of a “social contract” between 
citizens and their government as well. But it is often forgotten that this is a 
problematic concept – a metaphor, not a reality. Citizens in Africa, notably 
Ethiopia or any state created largely by conquest or conflict, are of course 
not aware of a contract which they entered voluntarily or were even asked 
about. The concept is thus normative and misleading as a guide to reality. 
Only if the political model or ideology governing a state or regime speaks of 
a contract and has participated in shaping it – in the form of a constitution 
or civic-republican institutions – can it be evaluated. But the constitution-
making process is usually opaque and top-down – it certainly was in Ethio-
pia. The Constitution of 1994 (effective in late 1995) looks great but cannot 
count as the embodied social contract, because it is not sufficiently but-
tressed by practical institutional-republican mechanisms that can guarantee 
it, and it is also often in contradiction with the governing ideology (and 
practices) of the EPRDF regime, which is “revolutionary democracy” (see 
below). This relies often on non-constitutional techniques, such as, e.g., 
administrative appointments on the basis of political loyalty instead of quali-
fication, non-transparent interference in the judicial process, political job 
                                                 
11  Based on G. Almond’s 1956 definition, cited in Formisano (2001: 396). 
12  Cf. also the definition in the online Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (<http://plato. 
stanford.edu/entries/republicanism>, accessed 30 January 2009). 
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demotions, and forced self-evaluation sessions (gimgema) on the basis of the 
party ideology and policy. In Ethiopia, where governance historically was 
“…based on the willingness of people to obey a ruler who was able to exer-
cise effective power”,13 there is no visible effort (or perceived need) of the 
ruling government to uphold and ground a “social contract” with citizens, 
who often face arbitrary measures and insecurity; and the main objective 
seems to be to keep power, which is indivisible. Republican values in Ethio-
pian politics are thus seriously underdeveloped. As Kassahun noted in a 
study of party politics in Ethiopia (2003: 142):  
“The autocratic mentality bequeathed by past rigid political culture 
(…) and the tendencies that uphold the politics of command (…) are 
very much alive today, as they were during imperial and revolutionary 
times.“ 
In the face of the faltering of democratisation and the perennial debates 
about its chances in Africa, attention should perhaps shift to the role of 
republicanism. Democracy – both in substance and procedures – will not de-
velop if the foundations of a republic (based on the four core ideas cited 
above) are not well-established.14 And, following Castiglione’s remark (2005: 
462), the continued relevance of republicanism in general, also in Africa, 
may be due to the fact that it is capable of “… projecting a positive vision of 
politics as the way of reconciling the natural differences traversing the social 
body”, be they economic, religious or ethnic. 
The 2nd Ethiopian Republic: Origins in  
Ideology and Battle 
Ethiopia is a former imperial monarchy, and in 1974, after the violent aboli-
tion of the monarch, Emperor Haile Selassie I, became a republic. But this 
turn was more by default, not by ideological conviction: not being a mon-
archy any longer made the country a republic, i.e., without a hereditary ruler, 
with no well founded legitimacy, and with “secular” authorities that would 
rule the country. The new regime would not only “serve” the national res 
publica, but determine what it was. After the demise of a monarchy, any republic 
                                                 
13  Cf. C. Clapham, Notes on the Ethiopian crisis, unpublished discussion paper, 7 November 
2005 (At: <www.fettan.com/Documents/C_clapham_Ethiopian_Crisis. pdf>, accessed 
on 8 April 2008). 
14  For the research agenda it is interesting to evaluate the presence of republican ideas 
in the indigenous political traditions of a country. In Ethiopia these were found 
among, e.g., the Oromo, the Gamo, the Afar and the Somali. 
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has the task of filling the ideological vacuum and devising a new rhetoric of 
sovereignty and legitimacy; and so it was in Ethiopia as well.  
Existing republics are not by definition “democratic”, as we know from 
literature and from historical experience, and can easily evolve into autoc-
racy or despotism. But the civic republican label conjures up people’s par-
ticipation, deliberative political process, and consent among partners in the 
furthering of public causes via effective and shared political decision-mak-
ing. The republican idea is also strongly anti-corruption and anti private 
profit-making in politics (this goes back to Machiavelli’s demands in Il Prin-
cipe). The contemporary political philosophy of “civic republicanism” is a 
largely Western offshoot of the republican tradition and not well-developed 
outside Western democracies. In Ethiopia, the republican idea was primarily 
defined through the prism of an anti-monarchy attitude. In the early 1970s in 
Ethiopia, in the spirit of the era, shaped by the massive influence of socialist 
and Marxist ideas especially among the politically articulate student move-
ment of the 1970s and 1980s (cf. Fentahun 1990; Balsvik 1985), Marxist-
communist ideas, such as “anti-feudal” class struggle and nationalisation of 
all land, held sway and came to dominate the polity. They would prove to 
have a nefarious impact.  
The ruling military council, the Derg, thus officially adopted Marxist so-
cialism as its ideology in 1975 and proceeded to create the “Popular Democ-
ratic Republic of Ethiopia”, with a due constitution in 1984. The Derg, under 
the upstart army officer lt.-col. Mengistu Haile-Mariam as president, thus 
strived to become a regular Communist “peoples’ republic” in the name of 
the toiling masses, and aimed at a classless society. It nationalised all land, 
created a state economy, allied with the Soviet camp, was ruled with military 
force, and did not allow political freedoms or an independent civil society. It 
instituted a discourse of ethno-regional rights for minorities (“nationalities” 
in Stalinist vein) but accorded them little autonomy. The economy soon 
faltered, agricultural policies were a disaster, democratic practices non-exis-
tent, and armed resistance movements were a plague until the demise of the 
Derg in May 1991, leading to the ushering in of the second (this time federal) 
republic of Ethiopia. As to the republic ideals mentioned above (liberty and 
popular sovereignty, non-domination, non-corruption, and institutional 
recognition of pluralism) the Derg’s political practises in the name of “So-
cialist” republican values that became self-contradictory worked against it. 
The Tigray Peoples’ Liberation Front (TPLF) took over in Addis 
Ababa in May 1991, after its victory in the armed struggle.15 As the ticket of 
                                                 
15  Similarly, its one-time ally the Eritrean Peoples’ Liberation Front (EPLF) almost 
simultaneously took power in Asmara, proceeding to declare the independence of 
Eritrea in 1993. As a former colony of Italy (until 1941), Eritrea was let go of with-
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the TPLF was ethno-nationalism, having its origins in an ideology to realize 
greater autonomy for the region of Tigray in a reformed Ethiopia (cf. Are-
gawi 2008), it went on to institute an ethnic-based political system that came 
to be known as “ethnic federalism” and in name a republic. It was presented 
at the Transitional National Conference in July 199116 and designed to meet 
the presumed ethno-regional grievances of the various groups (especially 
their elites) in Ethiopia, from the Oromo to the Sidama and the Afar to the 
Anyuaa, and as the leader of the TPLF declared in 1991, to create a volun-
tary union of all the nationalities in the country. They should not be forced 
into a union but choose to be part of it, was the idea. Here the core ele-
ments of republicanism were “ethnicised”, again yielding a highly contra-
dictory process. The concept of democracy was defined by means of the right 
of ethnic or linguistic groups to more autonomy, recognition, economic 
equality etc., and was not taken as the central concern of the new regime. 
For instance, representative democracy based on “one (wo)man, one vote” 
was not in the cards, only a nested regional-ethnic voting system, whereby 
ethnic, not national, parties could gain a foothold in the various regions of 
the country but hardly at all in the national parliament. It was also a model 
excellent for pursuing a divide-and rule-policy, “balancing” groups under the 
aegis of the centre (the ruling party). Ethiopian nationalism or national 
identity, in other words the shared public cause, was de-emphasised in the 
process. In the view of the EPRDF (the umbrella party uniting the TPLF 
with three other main ethnic-based satellite parties17), in Ethiopia there was 
not one sphere of the res publica, but many ethnically defined ones. In addi-
tion, the organisational model and the socio-economic ideas of the 
TPLF/EPRDF party remained strongly influenced by Marxism-Leninism, as 
evident in the activities of the Marxist-Leninist League of Tigray, founded in 
1985 as an ideological core within the TPLF and remaining active at least 
until 2001. Its ideological tenets are still visible in current policy, e.g. state 
ownership of land (inhibiting agrarian development and usable as a political 
control mechanism), strong control of the political process and of civil soci-
ety, the judiciary and the civil service, and in general a model of “democratic 
centralism” with the party as sole arbiter and power factor. A 2001 ideologi-
cal document by the EPRDF confirmed the view of the party elite that “lib-
                                                                                                         
out much consultation and debate and seen as having won the right to independ-
ence through struggle, although this implied giving up Ethiopia’s coastline, a still 
deeply controversial, because ill-negotiated move in Ethiopia. The problem came 
bouncing back in 1998, when the devastating new “border” war started between 
the two countries. The tension is still high and has no foreseeable solution. 
16  Resulting in the Transitional Period Charter for Ethiopia (22 July 1991). 
17  ANDM, OPDO and SEPDU. 
  The Ethiopian Second Republic and the Fragile “Social Contract” 11
 

 
eral democracy” was unfit for Ethiopia (see EPRDF 2001). Instead, the 
model of what was called “revolutionary democracy” (derived from the 
Leninist tradition) was followed.18 
The post-1991 reform agenda was promising, with party formation and 
elections allowed, more press freedom, programs for economic develop-
ment, fiscal reform, decentralisation and judicial reform. Progress was made 
on all fronts in the first ten years. At no point, however, was the leading role 
of the vanguard party, the EPRDF (i.e., TPLF and the three parallel parties), 
put at risk. The relevant political process occurred within the TPLF, and 
decisions made there were subsequently implemented. A few opposition 
groups who were part of the first transitional government in 1991 (like OLF 
and COEDF) were removed after disagreements. Some observers (Nord 
1991) already spoke in 1999 of a “blocked democracy”. Elections did not 
give the opposition a chance; that is, until 2005, the most free round ever 
seen, but which was spoiled by deep controversy and rigging. The 2005 
elections saw remarkable opposition gains and opened up the prospect of a 
coalition government and thus of real democracy (i.e., whereby a party could 
be voted out of office – an unthinkable idea for the EPRDF). But the results 
were deeply contested and quickly “revised”, and EPRDF and its prime 
minister declared themselves the sole winners. This was a turning point, 
away from the path of democracy, and full-blown monopolistic power was 
reinstated by the ruling party. The opposition parties in parliament have had 
no impact, their members and supporters often under attack.19 The April 
2008 elections for local councils also saw a serious setback in democratic 
practice, as ruling party cadres took no risk and pressurized the electorate to 
vote again, after the “mistake” of May 2005, for the EPRDF.20 The number 
                                                 
18  For an important manual on this ideology of rule, see the revealing position paper 
Our Revolutionary Democratic Goals and the Next Steps (1993), and the Guideline for 
EPRDF’s Organizational Structure and Operation (1997), produced by the party’s 
Dirigitawi Ma’ekel (Organisational Centre). Extracts were published in the magazine 
Ethiopian Register, issues of June 1996 and September 1997. Striking is the quite vio-
lent language and the dogmatic-socialist, “anti-bourgeois”, i.e., anti-middle-class, 
position in these documents. On this ideology, see also Vaughan and Tronvoll 
(2003, 116-117). 
19  Cf. a telling story in the newspaper Globe and Mail of 27 July 2007: Ethiopia turns its 
critics into untouchables. Cf. also an earlier Human Rights Watch report, Ethiopia: hidden 
crackdown in rural areas (13 January 2006). These rural crackdowns occur regularly. 
Important opposition figures, such as Ms. Birtukan Mideqsa (UDJ party), are regu-
larly pursued and put in jail on evidence that would likely not stand in any normal 
court of law; see Howden (2009). 
20  Cf. the Oxford Analytica report of 21 April 2008, Polls conduct reflects government pressures, online: 
<www.oxan.com/display.aspx?StoryDate=20080421&ProductCode=MEAFDB&Sto
ry Number=2&StoryType =DB)>.  See also Aalen & Tronvoll (2008). 
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of contested seats was also very limited, as most opposition candidates were 
forced to withdraw, citing intimidation and threat. Democracy in the 
EPRDF model is understood as “participation of the Ethiopian people at 
the grass roots level”, via the party and the government organs which “mo-
bilize the people”, not for debating and voting, but for executing policies 
and measures decided elsewhere. In today’s Ethiopia, people perceived as 
being pro-opposition (e.g., simply having voted for the opposition parties in 
2005 and supporting them) are often pursued, intimidated, and disadvan-
taged in the use of state services. Dominant party action thus punishes those 
not in line, and, as R. Lefort stated in a perceptive paper (2007), many in 
2005 deeply regretted having voted for the opposition because it unleashed 
the wrath of the ruling party and brought them nothing. In the post-2005 
years, traditional authoritarian political culture was confirmed, the govern-
ment easily tuning into it. 
In the past years, the Ethiopian republic has been further shaped as a 
“revolutionary-democratic” republic under PM Meles Zenawi (TPLF 
leader), who is now in his 18th year in power. Reforms have been proceed-
ing and have yielded a new political dispensation and economic growth (in 
2008 8% according to the IMF), although the latter is mainly of the aggre-
gate type and not of the distributive, inclusive type. Interesting is that the 
political power of the EPRDF as a party was buttressed by solid economic 
power, with much of the Ethiopian economy controlled by party-affiliated 
enterprises, endowments and business conglomerates. A new, tremendously 
wealthy, party-associated elite has meanwhile arisen in the wake of this ap-
propriation of the national economy.21  
The Federal Republic and the Ethnicity Factor 
The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia became a state with the 1994 
federal Constitution which emanated a strong democratic character and 
reflected Ethiopia as a party to all major international treaties on human 
rights and public law. It was secular, separating state and religion, but al-
lowed religious courts for personal and family matters (e.g. shari ‘a courts). 
Two houses of parliament were instituted, the first, the elected House of 
People’s Representatives (HPR), the second being the House of the Federa-
tion, a chamber based on the eleven new ethno-regions, which contains a 
number of elected and assigned delegates. It reflects the new ethnic-federal 
                                                 
21  See for one illustration: Ruling Party’s Business Conglomerate Grosses 4 Million USD, in 
the Ethiopian magazine Capital, August 2008, online: <http://www.capitalethiopia. 
com/archive/2008/august/local_news.htm#5>, 04-09-2008.  
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character of the political system and has few powers, mainly arbitration on 
constitutional matters regarding the ethnic federation, supervising laws from 
the HPR, and advisory roles. The 1994 Constitution, as said, is a nicely 
worded charter containing all the rights for citizens possible, but vests sov-
ereignty in the “nations, nationalities and peoples” of Ethiopia, a shady and 
ambiguous clause, innovative but much criticized, notably in relation to 
article 39 on their right to secession from the federation – a very unrepubli-
can notion. The role of the Executive (i.e., the government/dominant party) 
is also assigned a very strong position in the Constitution.  
The Ethiopian justice system was also overhauled, with virtually all per-
sonnel replaced or reshuffled. While various donor-country programs to 
professionalise it have been undertaken,22 reforms have been delayed or 
diverted. The Ethiopian public consistently complains about the courts’ lack 
of independence, their corruptibility, and their very time-consuming proce-
dures. There are enough indications that government pressure regularly leads 
to interference with and abrogation of the judicial process. 
The new system of “regional states”, roughly based on majority ethnic-
ity, led to a formally more autonomous political structure. Numerous studies 
have, however, indicated that these regional administrations have a dual 
structure, remaining under the tutelage of the federal government and the 
ruling party. Behind the visible office holders who come from the states 
themselves (i.e., being of the “right ethnic background”) stand advisors and 
policy makers linked directly to the federal EPRDF offices. In this way, 
policy coherence, organisational unity and executive control are thought to 
be best guaranteed. It means that informal political channels remain very 
important, if not decisive (cf. Paulos 2007). 
In post-1991 Ethiopia ethnic identities, mainly in the form of linguistic-
cultural background and based on Stalin’s conception of “nationalities” 
(originally in his work The National Question and Marxism, 1914) were recog-
nized politically and made the basis of regional and local administrations, to 
be filled by local people (often to the exclusion of so-called “non-natives” 
despite their job qualifications). As such this was a new answer to the prob-
lems of multi-ethnic Ethiopia, but the tensions between population groups 
on the national and local level were far from solved by it. Ethno-political 
competition emerged, also exclusionist discriminatory practices, and con-
flicts on power and budgets. Indeed, in looking at the number of local-level 
communal clashes – many violent – and the changing popular conceptions 
                                                 
22  See World Bank, Ethiopia: Legal and Judicial Sector Assessment, Washington, DC, 2004, 
and the report Ethiopia – Comprehensive Justice System Reform Program, Baseline Study Re-
port, Addis Ababa: Ministry of Capacity Building – Leiden: Center for International 
Legal Cooperation, 2005, 531 p. 
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of the “causes” of conflict, it can be said that a conflict-generating dynamic 
was perpetuated. New conflicts appeared between groups previously not 
known for having problems (cf. the case of the Yem and the Oromo, dis-
cussed in Solomon 2006: 85). In 1994 political scientist M. Ottaway already 
warned of the approach taken in Ethiopia towards the “national question”, 
saying “… it was the least promising” (Ottaway 1994: 50), and that it offered 
a lesson on “… how ethnic conflict should not be managed by countries 
pursuing democratisation” (ibid. 3). Her expectation that the country headed 
for more conflict and repression, not for democracy (ibid. 51) can unfortu-
nately only be confirmed 14 years later. Both in the domestic political sphere 
and in relations with several neighbours (the Ethio-Eritrean war of 1998-
2000; Ethiopian presence in the war in Somalia since 2006), conflict is seri-
ous, costly, and hindering political and developmental progress. 
As to ethnic relations, C. Barnes stated in a survey of Ethiopian devel-
opments in 2006 that:  
“A combination of environmental stress and poverty, combined with 
competitive ethnic politics in response to the system of ethnic feder-
alism favoured by the current government, has seen a rise in violent 
and deadly ethnic clashes. Deep-rooted political problems have not 
been solved by ethnic federalism …” (Barnes 2006: 7).  
Indeed, the federal structure has rarely effectively dealt with them. Some of 
these conflicts deflect attention from the issues in the national arena, em-
broiling the so-called ethnic groups in petty fights about boundaries, land, 
state subsidies and other material interests, as well as prestige battles about 
which group has the primordial rights, is “the best”, etc. This perhaps fits 
the national government just fine, taking away pressure from the national 
level, but the ideal of a voluntary federal union of equal and recognized 
“ethnic” or ethno-regional groups in a common federation (as the declared 
aim was in 1991) has been much hindered by it. Opponents of the govern-
ment talk of persistent ethnic discrimination, preferential politics, economic 
favouritism and cronyism via unequal resource allocation and business op-
portunities, and party (EPRDF) dominance of the economy.23 This message 
and critique are too serious to ignore or to be regarded fictitious. In a way, 
the Ethiopian population, while aware of ethno-regional difference, conflicts 
and inequities in the past (in the wake of the imperial conquest of the late 
1800s), has now itself fallen into the trap of ethnicizing social and commu-
nity relations, thus often blighting daily relations and creating new opposi-
                                                 
23  A 2007 World Bank report estimated that ca. 50-55% of the national economy is 
controlled by party-affiliated business and conglomerates. Virtually all state organs 
and (civic) institutions are led by party members. 
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tions. E.g., when there is contestation over a piece of land or pasture, the 
dispute is now declared to be between two ethnic groups/nationalities (in 
Amharic: behéresebotch), and not between farmers and pastoralists, or high-
landers and lowlanders. This process undermines the democratic and issue-
directed solution of concrete problems, and flouts the principles of the re-
public. A notable feature in these conflicts is that more and more of these 
groups are demanding a special administrative statute for “their” territory. In 
the logic derived from the principle embodied in article 39 of the Constitu-
tion, about the right of every group “to self-determination up to secession” 
(sic), the Ethiopian federal state has devised the possibility for groups to 
obtain a “special woreda” (= district) status for their unit. E.g., in the case of 
the Dirashe and Gauwwada conflict in April-May 2008, the latter group 
claimed such a status, which the Dirashe already had. There is thus great 
pressure from groups (or rather from their aspiring elites) who so want to 
claim such mini-autonomy within the larger whole, thereby rendering it 
more difficult to co-operate and focus on common issues.24 This “logic of 
fragmentation” is worrying and will weaken the federal structure, not to 
speak of its subverting republican-democratic principles. To illustrate the 
extent of the ongoing problems in this sphere: in 2008, apart from the 
Dirashe-Gauwwada, there were lethal clashes between the Borana and the 
Somali, the Konso and the Borana, the Guji and the Burji, and the Gumuz 
and the Oromo, and law enforcement usually came too late and offered no 
structural solutions. The largest domestic conflict is in the Ogaden (Re-
gion 5, Somali), which has been going on since May 2007, where the gov-
ernment engaged in a massive counter-insurgency campaign against the 
rebel Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF),25 which claims autonomy 
or self-determination for the Somali region. Unwisely the group followed a 
very violent tactic to force the issue. It is a conflict away from world media 
attention, but characterized by massive abuse also against civilians, and deci-
sively undermines state legitimacy.26 
This problem, coupled with the economic, financial and food insecurity 
issues, the tension with Eritrea, the war in Somalia and the unresolved (bor-
                                                 
24  It can also lead to the successful formation of new “ethnic” groups, such as the 
predominantly Muslim Silt’i people. First seen as a part of the Gurage-speaking 
peoples, they voted in a 2001 referendum for and were allowed to form their own 
ethnic zone, thus gaining more local power and more federal budget allocations. 
25  After an ONLF terrorist attack on an oil exploration site in April 2007 when 65 
people (Ethiopians and Chinese) were killed in cold blood. 
26  See: A forgotten war draining a forgotten people, The Guardian, 24 March 2008; also: Images 
back Ethiopia abuse claim, BBC News message, 12 June 2008 (online at: <http://news. 
bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7450533.stm>). 
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der) issues with Sudan, puts the Ethiopian regime in a difficult position and 
limits its range of options. In fact, in many measures taken in the last few 
years – and the elections of May 2005 are a turning point here – a kind of 
“despair”, as some observers called it, is noticeable. This is combated with a 
firm authoritarian hand trying to intimidate critical voices and dissidents and 
to reinforce power from above. Democratic consultation with the popula-
tion, with civil society organisations or with opposition groups is thereby 
not needed. Political practice and governance techniques in today’s Ethiopia 
still reveal a vanguard party model of an unquestioned political elite which 
“is always right”. This happens under a “revolutionary-democratic” ideology 
adhered to by the ruling party (see the EPRDF 2001 document). It is a 
modern variant of Leninism and keeps in place a party model of democratic 
centralism and a cadre structure that is not very responsive to discontent 
and legitimate concerns from below as expressed by the citizens. An exam-
ple are the goings-on in the Ethiopian Parliament, where MPs show no 
initiative, often doze through sessions, usually follow all that the govern-
ment party says, and where the opposition, which has virtually no resources 
– no working budget, no offices – can raise its voice but has no impact. Af-
ter another round of arrests among the political opposition, Prof. Beyene 
Petros, a prominent opposition party member, said in December 2008: “The 
government is totally reducing us to nothing …” (Chebsi 2009). In Septem-
ber 2008, an interesting change in the political system occurred when the 
House of People’s Representatives (the parliament) voted to pass a bill 
called the “Definition of Powers and Duties of the Executive Organs of the 
Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Proclamation” (No. 471/2005), 
authorizing the Council of Ministers (i.e. the Executive) to establish, reor-
ganise, divide or close down federal executive organs (such as Ministries) 
when deemed necessary.27 The law also gives the Council power to decide 
on procedures to establish any executive organ’s accountability. The Execu-
tive thus claimed unlimited legislative powers to reorganise the federal ex-
ecutive organs without the parliament exerting supervision or approval. 
Another sign of democratic decay is the growing suppression of the lo-
cal independent media: most free-press newspapers have disappeared and 
their editors jailed, charged in court, or urged to leave the country. A further 
example is the new NGO law (submitted to parliament in October 2008 and 
approved in January 200928), one of the most restrictive in the world, and 
                                                 
27  See: B. Shewareged, Government unlimited. Lawmakers cede power to the executive, in 
Reporter (Addis Ababa news magazine), 11 October 2008. 
28 See: Ethiopia imposes aid agency curbs, BBC news item (online: <http://news.bbc.co.uk 
/2/hi/africa/7814145.stm, accessed 30.01.2009>). 
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even criticised by Ethiopia’s foremost ally the US.29 It would submit all 
NGOs to close government scrutiny, and proposed to reduce foreign finan-
cial support for each local NGO to a maximum of 10% of their total budget 
and would also impose strict penalties for minor administrative irregulari-
ties.30 This will mean closing shop for most of them, since due to limited 
resources among the public and massive inflation since 2007 (50-70% on 
basic commodities), financial stress in Ethiopia is serious, making it impos-
sible to raise the funds domestically. Advertised as a measure to increase “trans-
parency”, etc. this seems to be a top-down control tactic aimed at disabling 
NGOs, many of whom in the past decade had a significant role in enlight-
ening and empowering people in civic action and encouraging the democra-
tisation agenda. As a last example, I would like to mention a recent EPRDF 
document (June 2008) on the party’s performance and plans which proposes 
a new higher education policy whereby the EPRDF would select students 
for MA and PhD programs, with c. 70% to be in science and technology 
and 30% in the social sciences (the latter being a serious reduction of their 
previous share). This would mean screening not by the universities but by 
the party and the evaluation of candidates would thus be not only based on 
academic but also on “political” qualifications.31 
On the basis of the objective facts one cannot but conclude that the de-
mocratic-republican potential of the 1991 regime change has not been real-
ised. There is a creeping but systematic reinforcement of the executive branch 
going on, leading to an even further disempowerment of the parliament and 
of civil society. Chances for political reform and a broadening of the political 
basis of the regime are still there, in line with the promises made in 1991, but 
they cannot be realised without major changes in the ruling party’s policies or 
without a move towards institutional democratisation and civic republican 
values. These seem for systemic reasons unlikely to materialise soon.32 
                                                 
29  See: P. Heinlein, US says draft Ethiopian NGO law would ‘close political space’, VOA, 
online: <http://www.voanews.com/english/2008-10-21-voa68.cfm?rss=human%20 
rights%20and%20law>, accessed 25.10.08. 
30  See: Human Rights Watch, Ethiopia: government prepares assault on civil society, online: 
<http://www.hrw.org.pub/2008/africa/HRW.NGO.Law.Analysis.pdf>, accessed 
30.08.2008, and ibid., Ethiopia: draft law threatens civil society, 13 October 2008, online: 
<http://hrw.org/english/docs/2008/10/13/ethiop19947.htm>, accessed 20.10.2008. 
31  Cited in Ethiopian news weekly Addis Neger (19 August 2008). This proposal has since 
been accepted and put into practice. It seems to be an academically unacceptable return 
to a kind of state-dirigist policy for education, akin to that of Eritrea or North Korea. 
Students commonly complain that after graduating they can hardly find a job in public 
service or party-affiliated companies if they are not a member of the ruling party. 
32  Even a hard-core foreign supporter of the EPRDF, the American academic and ex-
diplomat Paul Henze, has voiced serious doubts over the party’s approach and has 
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The International Perspective 
As a sizeable country with potential, a strategic position, and a more or less 
stable regime in the volatile Horn of Africa, Ethiopia is a major recipient of 
Western donor money. Although often engaged in domestic repression and 
closure of democratic and civil society space, having conducted a war in 
Somalia in 2006-2008, a violent campaign in the Ogaden, and having a bad 
press on human rights and media freedoms, it is not the subject of sanctions 
by the international community, like Sudan or Zimbabwe. It has growth 
figures in GDP, exports, in infrastructure and foreign investments, although 
there are signs of stagnation and financial difficulty, evidenced by wide-
spread food shortages and run-away inflation since mid-2007. The Western 
donors have expressed dismay over the dubious 2005 elections, over the 
government forces killing some 190 demonstrators in 2005, and over the 
general repression that followed. While the Western Donor Countries 
Group had committed itself to furthering democracy before the 2005 elec-
tions, had encouraged opposition parties to compete and the government to 
allow them, they dropped the process like a stone after the wave of repres-
sion, and did not assist the opposition parties and their leaders when it was 
most needed. Declarations of disapproval were issued and some develop-
ment funding was stopped or delayed. But they did not take serious action, 
in fact kept supporting the regime in power. While donor countries cannot 
prescribe the political system in other countries but only ask for account-
ability regarding the funds spent in line with agreements made, donor coun-
try and IMF-World Bank policies do have the effect of reinforcing the pow-
ers-that-be, notably the Executive, and have not contributed directly to the 
furthering of democratic structures or the shared res publica. In terms of the 
four republican values mentioned above, the contribution of the donor 
community can only be seen as very modest. 
For some observers, core donors like the USA and the UK, and hesi-
tantly other EU countries, even seem to be the “enemy of change” here – 
despite the recurring political crises, the repression of opposition, and fal-
tering agrarian and other policies, they are usually prepared to accept new 
promises from the astute Ethiopian leadership. The international commu-
nity primarily sees Ethiopia as a rather powerful state in an important geo-
political niche (cf. the global anti-terrorism campaigns) that has not de-
scended into chaos, like Somalia, is not insular and inaccessible, like Eritrea, 
and not negatively anti-Western and defiant, like Sudan. Ethiopia – also in 
                                                                                                         
proposed changes. See his unpublished paper Seizing the Future (2007). See also 
<http://smgebru.blogspot.com/2008/06/ethiopia-henzes-views-on-eprdf.html>, 
accessed 02.08.2008.  
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view of its previously prudent fiscal policies and its developed bureaucracy – 
is a projection of hope. Indeed, one regularly hears EU diplomats saying 
something like: 
“If things do not succeed in Ethiopia [political reform, democratiza-
tion, state stability, economic growth, realization of at least a good 
number of the MDCs, JA], then it will not work anywhere. The per-
ception is that they must be a success and be supported, however cau-
tiously …” 
But meanwhile developments on the ground do not seem to be conducive 
to such a process. Apart from the political insecurities in Ethiopia and the 
constant arguments about rights violations and repression, there is also the 
question of what exactly happened with the c. U$ 24 billion in development 
aid that the country has received since the ascent of the EPRDF 17 years 
ago: where did it go and what did it yield? Economist observers ask what the 
balance sheet says, why there still is no food security, no take-off in small-
holder peasant agriculture, no balancing of imports and exports, no sus-
tained growth in commodity production, no decline in (the dramatic) urban 
unemployment,33 etc.  
The Ethiopian government has in fact two trains running: tacit and 
material support in the form of aid (funds, projects) from the West (notably 
the US and EU), requiring skilful rhetoric and support for anti-terrorism 
campaigns in the wider region; and secondly, the Chinese connection: for 
investments, cheaper tenders for infrastructural works, ICT work, business 
deals, and also for the political model (dominant party, no political pluralism 
or dissent, non-interference in “internal affairs”), with no questions asked. 
This strategy allows the government to immunise itself more and more from 
critique and from calls for accountability, and pursue its own course. 
Conflict and the Federal-Republican Structure:  
a “Fragile State”? 
Is Ethiopia a fragile, failing or failed state? “Failed state” is obviously a rela-
tive term, not an absolute one. Definitions of the phenomenon vary, but it 
                                                 
33  Cf. the World Bank report Urban Labour Markets in Ethiopia: Challenges and Prospects, 
vol. 1, Washington, DC, 2007; also the quite critical but well-researched report The 
Ethiopian Economy (52 p.) made available online: <www.ethiomedia.com/access/ 
ethiopia_in_the_global_economy.pdf>, accessed 15.04.2008). See also D. A. Ali, S. 
Dercon & M. Gautam, Property rights in a very poor country: tenure insecurity and investment in 
Ethiopia, Washington, DC: World Bank policy research working paper no. 4363, 2007. 
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can be said to refer to a state that lacks control over its own territory, threat-
ens its own citizens, or does not fulfil essential functions such as maintain-
ing the state monopoly on violence, provision of basic services and protec-
tion of legal rights for people, and lacks efficient and fair taxation.34 Prime 
examples are Sierra Leone, DR Congo or Liberia during the civil wars, and 
nowadays Somalia, Chad, or Sudan.35 The “international community” is 
concerned with failed or failing states because of the security risks they pose 
to a wider region (cf. Batt & Lynch 2004).  
Ethiopia’s rating on the FS index of Foreign Policy (see note 6) says it is 
not doing so well. But seeing the (comparative) strength and extent of the 
state apparatus, its developed civil service (regardless of its effectiveness and 
skills), its armed forces active on several fronts, the limited impact of insur-
gent movements, and the great strides made in institution-building (never 
mind their skewed and often weak character), as well as growth in GDP and 
infrastructure, one would say no, certainly as compared to the examples 
mentioned above, where whole areas of the national territory are not under 
effective control and people have no access to state services at all. In Ethio-
pia, apart from the Ogaden, where a massive counter-insurgency campaign 
is going on, most Ethiopian territory is under control and under the surveil-
lance of the government. There is a spread of (enforced) party structures in 
the countryside, and the security services are alert in most places. So the 
fragility of the Ethiopian state is a moot point. The donor community, no-
tably the US, does not think either that Ethiopia is “fragile” and in fact has 
bet on its continuity (“it must succeed”). As evident in Somalia, the Ogaden 
and in the 1998-2000 Eritrean war, the state has firm control over the secu-
rity forces and largely maintains its monopoly on the means of violence. 
Also the national taxation regime is steadily expanding. But in some respects 
Ethiopia might still be called a “failed state”, because it targets civilians in 
insurgent areas (Ogaden, Oromiya), cannot offer millions of people basic 
food security (every year), fails on basic services, cannot guarantee basic rule 
of law for all, follows arbitrary practices whereby citizens cannot be secure 
of life and property,36 where due judicial process is not guaranteed and peo-
                                                 
34  An effort at operationalisation is found in Stewart & Brown (2008).  
35  There are also some, what one might call, “successful failed states”, e.g. Nigeria or 
the CAR or Gabon, which lack control of their entire state territory, are embroiled 
in conflict and have very bad state services, but are resilient and manage to survive 
and even flourish in selected domains. They are perhaps failing, but not in danger 
of total collapse. 
36 See the reports of the EHRCO, the US Dept. of State, Human Rights Watch, etc. 
Ethiopians also lack well-defined property rights, which can be revoked and reshuf-
fled at will by the government, especially in the countryside. Cf. Ali, et al. 2007, 
cited in note 33 above.  
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ple are often deeply humiliated by government agencies. Compensation after 
conflict is non-existent; unjust job dismissal or expropriation frequent.  
While it is debatable that Ethiopia’s state is failing, it can at least be said 
that the state’s “functionality” is weak (cf. Clapham 2006: 17): it does not 
work well for all citizens, as revealed in the constant insecurity and the un-
predictability of state action vis-à-vis the populace. The “social contract” idea, 
if seen in the constitutional-republican sense, and which in Ethiopia was 
closely tied up with a vision of the nation and of “unity among diversity”, is 
very tenuous. The legitimacy of the state is fragile. There is no more imag-
ined community; indeed it was for years actively discouraged by the ruling 
government because for ideological reasons (anti-Amhara domination) they 
proclaimed Ethiopian unity as fictitious and a product of imposition since 
the 1880s (the decades of imperial conquest). Many ordinary people are 
committed to the country but see the social fabric of society crumble. A 
Gallup poll of 200737 indicated that the confidence of Ethiopians in their 
institutions and in their government was extremely low, even as compared 
with other countries in the African region: only 28% had trust in the gov-
ernment, only 13% in the health care system, and only 24% in the judicial 
system and the courts. From a survey on livelihood activities and social and 
political opinions that I made in 2007 among 73 ordinary citizens in Addis 
Ababa and in the South (SNNPRS) these figure were confirmed.38 Trust is a 
scarce commodity in the political system. Stories about government per-
formance and cadre activity show irritation and veiled, or scathing, critical 
remarks, the bottom line of which is:  
“… they can’t let us decide on our own, they bother us unduly, they 
are a costly lot interfering with our lives and getting little results. But 
that is government in this country.”39  
In addition, rural people see themselves as more vulnerable to livelihood 
shocks resulting from natural conditions and the policy uncertainties (e.g., 
related to rights to land, affordable inputs like fertilizer, or market access), 
and as losing “social capital”. 
While the government claims not to heed such findings, it sees the need 
for continued control and monitoring (called in Amharic kitittil ). The above 
figures and statements, among other things, go to show the fragility of the 
                                                 
37 See: <http://www.gallup.com/poll/104029/Few-Ethiopians-Confident-Their-Insti 
tutions.aspx> (accessed 4 February 2008). 
38  This survey was made among a group of people that I have been interviewing on 
various issues for the past 10 years, as well as among new respondents in several 
urban and rural locations. 
39  Group interview in Shone, southern Ethiopia, 7 December 2007. 
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republican-democratic basis of the regime, engendering opposition from 
ethnic, regional and increasingly religion-based groupings. This opposition 
can be kept at bay by force, as the regime now often does, but this is erod-
ing its basis and legitimacy and is getting quite costly. Coupled with growing 
cracks in economic-financial policy, as evident from the skyrocketing infla-
tion in 2008, stagnating production, food deficiencies, rising imports, and 
budget deficits due to war, counter-insurgency and an expensive cadre party 
system,40 the tensions may increase the fragility of governance and state 
mal-functioning. That the government is sensitive to this is shown by the 
sudden institution in 2008 of “Flag Day” – publicly staged flag-raising 
ceremonies across the country, presumably to display an idea of unity or 
national identity, but viewed with scepticism and ironic humour by the 
ordinary public. 
n Experiment: in Need of  
y the then Military 
Cou
                                                
The Republica
Adjustment? 
Republicanism is an ideology developed mainly in Europe and the USA (cf. 
Maynor 2003; Pettit 1997), and other examples in countries with a quite 
different political and economic trajectory cannot be judged on the basis of 
that. Nevertheless, the ideology has travelled rapidly across the globe and 
was explicitly taken as a model of governance in many post-colonial and 
developing countries, including Ethiopia. While the democratic potential has 
been inherent in republican thinking already since Cicero, one might ask 
whether democratic structures can be developed in the absence of any repub-
lican traditions. There are, of course, several such examples – the U.K., the 
Netherlands, or Thailand – but they issued from the growth of countervail-
ing forces such as parties, economic players such as labour unions, and a 
powerful middle class vis-à-vis the monarchy, and under pressure from strong 
republican ideas. In most developing countries, where the state is a relatively 
new and coveted resource machine in conditions of scarcity, the odds are 
not in favour of this. In Ethiopia there was one effort from above in 1974 
when in the insecure revolutionary transition phase a new constitution was 
prepared which would have made the country into a constitutional monar-
chy with parliamentary control. But it was rejected b
ncil, which aimed to retain full control from above. 
Governance in Ethiopia is still marked by an overall fixation on con-
trol: control of political space (no elections can be lost), control of economic 
 
40  There are tens of thousands of cadres active across Ethiopia, economically non-
productive but of course receiving salaries and resources. 
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space (the dominant ruling party as the chief economic player), control over 
the judiciary, and control of civic space – no grass roots associations, no 
independent trade unions or media or teachers’ unions, and no independent 
NGOs can operate, in short no autonomous, independent socio-political 
dynamics can develop. A new middle class, which is inevitable in emerging, 
and newly self-conscious farming populations, part of which start or want to 
start entrepreneurial activities, are closely checked and are not allowed to 
demand representation as such, in their own organisations independent of 
the ruling party. As we saw, on the contrary, the EPRDF is continuing to 
organise and co-opt the rural population in party structures so that they can 
be surveyed and used to help execute the top-down policies drawn up in the 
towers of power, the party offices in Addis Ababa. Whether rightly so or 
not, the EPRDF as a vanguard party – a unique creature as a party of cadres, 
not of elected, representative members from a voluntary constituency – is 
seen as on the “correct course”, and will not be questioned. The only “de-
mocratic” practice within the party is debate and exchange of ideas on the 
proposals put forward by the party executive and duly amended on minor 
points. If major friction occurs, as in 2001 – the wake of the Ethio-Eritrean 
war of 1998-2000 – the party dissidents are expulsed (“purged”) and sent 
into the wilderness, dismissed and put under surveillance (cf. the case of 
former top leader Siyye Abraha, who fell from grace in 2001). This is an 
interesting, hundred-year old party model (from the time of Lenin’s Bolshe-
vist party), but increasingly rare in the world, and with big drawbacks. A 
republican model would recognize the fact of pluralism and allow a shared 
political arena where various groups and parties would contest and co-oper-
ate to make policy, and where the state is not seen as a patrimony of which 
one elite or party – however well-organised or “well-informed” they might 
be – is the sole custodian. The ruling party in Ethiopia has wrought indeed 
tremendous socio-political change and created a new economic dynamic 
which can have major positive effects, but the benefits have not yet been 
reaped (cf. Lefort 2007 for some peasant responses). The party has replaced 
the previous autocracies – on the basis of divine (imperial) right and Marxist 
class solidarity and “sovereignty of the workers” – with a new rhetorical 
model of centralist, post-Marxist vanguardism based on successful armed 
struggle (concluded in 1991) and the so-called sovereignty of “peoples, na-
tions, and nationalities”, of which it, as a neo-Leninist vanguard, is the sole 
standard bearer. It is a questionable claim to exclusionist (Kassahun 2003: 
143) if not absolutist rule, reminiscent of the former regimes, and under-
mining a republican system. The classic point made already by Machiavelli in 
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his Discourses on Livy (1531),41 that a republic, in forging the shared public 
cause, is served by harbouring and tolerating dissent or friction (cf. Maynor 
2003
 state, 
the i
                                                
: 30), and not by criminalising and suppressing it, is forgotten. 
Whether Ethiopia’s hierarchical-authoritarian political culture is sus-
ceptible to or “ripe” for change in this respect stands to be seen (cf. Lyons 
2008; Vaughan & Tronvoll 2003: 34). The odds are slim, because like in 
many other African countries, a democratic-republican culture is not evolv-
ing and not furthered in Ethiopia, and fundamental public debates about the 
republican tradition are discouraged. Hierarchy, obedience and forceful 
authority, inherited from the old imperial system and reinforced by the 
Marxist-military regime until 1991, are still dominant. The pluralism of 
ethno-cultural groups is not well-integrated into the national system either. 
This has often inhibited the productive articulation of local political tradi-
tions with the national level of administration. It is for the dominant party 
(EPRDF), which has set the agenda in the past 18 years, to make a dent in 
that political culture with new legal measures and inclusive socio-economic 
policies. Elite action impacts on political culture.42 Gradual social and eco-
nomic change creating a broader middle class – visible in some domains – 
will also contribute its part, against state repression, but the process is slow, 
especially when thwarted from above and when slowed down by economic 
crisis and the growth of poverty (as seen in Ethiopia since early 2006, with 
skyrocketing inflation and budget deficits due to, among others, a war effort 
to assist the Transitional Federal Government in Somalia). The expectations 
among observers, academics, Western donors and the vocal Ethiopia dias-
pora of the coming of democracy to Ethiopia have to be tempered: if the 
country has not even been able to establish the basics of a republican
nstitutionalisation of a democracy will even be more problematic. 
Finally, researching African cases of republicanism and republican poli-
tics, or of the efforts thereto, is a challenge for the comparative study of 
political thought and governance, both for theoretical and practical reasons. 
In Europe and America the growing attraction of republicanism in the last 
few decades may be due to the general rejection of “… teleology of ideol-
ogy-based narratives of political thought” (Castiglione 2005: 453). Because 
republican ideas take a middle ground between liberalism and collectivist 
ideologies to forge a shared procedural agenda for pluralist countries, they 
may have an important role to play in future politics, as elites, intellectuals, 
 
41  This unsurpassed work, more than his treatise The Prince, expounds Machiavelli’s 
real political philosophy. 
42  This factor of elite agency in the study of political culture is also theoretically of great 
importance. 
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Die 2. Republik in Äthiopien und der “fragile Gesellschaftsvertrag“ 
Zusammenfassung: Das Jahr 1991 sah die Inauguration der 2. Republik in 
Äthiopien, diesmal als föderal-demokratische statt wie bisher als Volksrepu-
blik. Achtzehn Jahre nach dem Machtwechsel besteht bei den meisten Be-
obachtern Konsens über die Probleme im politischen Prozess des Landes. 
Konstatiert wird die Rückkehr zu einem stark autoritären Regime, das eine 
repräsentative parlamentarische Demokratie so gut wie unmöglich macht. 
Der Artikel präsentiert eine Analyse der wichtigsten allgemeinen ideologi-
schen Grundsätze der heutigen äthiopischen Republik und ihrer führenden 
Partei. Unter Einbeziehung der wachsenden Kritik im In- und Ausland (Ge-
bergemeinschaft) und der Diskussion über „fragile“ oder „scheiternde Staa-
ten“ wird die Herrschaftspraxis in Äthiopien untersucht. Der neue „Gesell-
schaftsvertrag“ von 1991, kodifiziert in der neuen Verfassung von Dezem-
ber 1994, ist prekär und wird nicht mehr akzeptiert. Parteipolitische und 
ethno-regionale Opposition der föderalen Poli
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sieru
en Staates. Dabei empfiehlt sich im allgemeinen eine explizitere 
Schlagwörter: Äthiopien; Republikanismus; Demokratisierung; Ethnizität; 
Politische Kultur; Fragile Staaten 
ng. Eine öffentliche Debatte über die ethno-föderale republikanische 
Formel und den Staatsaufbau wird kaum toleriert, vielleicht weil die Macht-
haber selbst keine Alternative sehen (wollen).  
Der Artikel legt eine Interpretation des ethno-föderalen Verwaltungs-
systems in Äthiopien vor, die auf das noch immer nicht gelöste Problem der 
Harmonisierung von lokalen und modernen Elementen der politischen 
Praxis in einem Entwicklungsland rekurriert, und macht einen konzeptio-
nellen Vorschlag über den Status der nominell für wichtig gehaltenen, aber 
in der politischen Praxis abwesenden „republikanischen“ Prinzipien des 
äthiopisch
Debatte dieser Prinzipien und Ideen statt der, heute auch in der akademi-
schen Diskussion ziemlich „überforschten“, ethno-föderalen Aspekte des 
Staates.  
